{"id":372,"date":"2012-03-15T12:32:20","date_gmt":"2012-03-15T12:32:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/rulesofreason.wordpress.com\/?p=372"},"modified":"2012-03-15T12:32:20","modified_gmt":"2012-03-15T12:32:20","slug":"torture-and-game-theory","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/re-design.dimiter.eu\/?p=372","title":{"rendered":"Torture and game theory"},"content":{"rendered":"

The latest issue of Political Research Quarterly<\/a> has an interesting and important exchange about the use of game theory to understand the effectiveness of torture\u00a0for eliciting truthful information. In this post I summarize the discussion, which is quite instructive for illustrating the prejudices and misunderstandings people have about the role and utility of game theory as a tool to gain insights\u00a0into the social world.<\/p>\n

In the original article<\/a>, Schiemann builds a strategic\u00a0incomplete-information game between a detainee (who can\u00a0either posses valuable information or not, and be either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’) and a state which can be either ‘pragmatic’ (using torture only for valuable information) or ‘sadistic’ (torturing in all circumstances). There are two additional parameters capturing uncertainty about the value and completeness of the information provided by the detainee, and two styles of interrogation (providing leading evidence or not). The article\u00a0then proceeds to identify the equilibria of the game, which turn out to be quite a few (six),\u00a0and quite different\u00a0– in some, truthful information is provided while\u00a0in others, not; in some, torture is applied while\u00a0in others, not; etc….\u00a0At this point\u00a0you will be excused\u00a0for\u00a0wondering\u00a0what’s the point of the formal modeling if it only shows that, depending on the parameters, different things are possible.<\/p>\n

Schiemann, however, makes a brilliant move by comparing each of these equilibria to some minimal normative standards that proponents of torture claim to uphold – namely, that torture\u00a0should not<\/strong> be used on detainees who have provided all their information, that transmitted information\u00a0should be\u00a0generally reliable<\/strong>,\u00a0and that in all cases only the minimum<\/strong> effective amount of torture\u00a0should be applied. It turns out that none of these minimal normative standards are sustained by any of the equlibria of the game.\u00a0If interrogational torture is to ‘generate valuable information, innocent detainees must be tortured for telling the truth’.<\/strong> The intuition is that unless the threat of torture is present, even ‘weak’ detainees would not confess, but for the threat of the torture is to be credible, it needs to be applied to innocent detainees as well (which, of course, from the point of view of the state are observationally equivalent to strong and knowledgeable detainees). Things get even uglier. ‘Proposition 4. Once torture is admitted as an interrogation technique, the strategic incentives facing the interrogator result in increasingly harsh forms of torture<\/em>.’ Overall, the conclusion is that, ‘An outcome resulting in valuable information…is possible, but the conditions supporting it are empirically unlikely<\/em>.’<\/p>\n

Let’s recap what Schiemann’s formal analysis\u00a0has demonstrated: the use of torture can never extract valuable information unless innocents are tortured and\u00a0the frequency and intensity is rather\u00a0high, and even then it would be very difficult to\u00a0separate\u00a0valid information from all the\u00a0other\u00a0‘confessions’ made during the interrogations. For me, this is a devastating critique on the use of torture – the analysis not only shows that the effectiveness of torture is likely to be very low (empirical evidence has already pointed in that direction), but it shows why<\/strong> torture doesn\u2019t work (unless one\u00a0violates\u00a0minimal normative standards that even proponents of the practice espouse).<\/p>\n

Dustin Ells Howes, however, begs to differ. In a response<\/a> to this analysis, entitled ‘Torture Is Not a Game: On the Limitations and Dangers of Rational Choice Methods<\/em>‘, \u00a0he questions the fundamental premise of the analysis that torture can be modeled as a strategic interaction between agents who possess information, preferences and control over their actions. His main point is that under torture humans cannot be considered to have any agency at all. Fair enough, but then he proceeds to discuss\u00a0how some individual can withstand torture after all by the force of ‘free will’. So, ultimately there are\u00a0distinct states of the\u00a0world that follow the exercise of torture – ‘confession’ (false or real)\u00a0and ‘no confession’. So what’s the quibble with the game-theoretic analysis? Granted, it sound a bit perverse to talk about confessing under circumstances that destroy your entire sense of being a person,\u00a0in addition to\u00a0overwhelming physical pain that they bring, as a choice, but it matters little for the analysis whether you label it ‘choice’ or\u00a0something else (‘expression of a strong free will'[?]). The fact remains that the state cannot sort out in advance which detainees possess information, which will confess, and which have already told everything they know. So torturing often and\u00a0harshly and punishing innocents and those who actually reveal everything they know is unavoidable once one accepts the use of torture as a legitimate tool.<\/p>\n

But in the mind of Howes, one should not even\u00a0try to reason<\/strong> about the effectiveness of torture. It is dangerous to\u00a0attempt to model torture, because, even if the current model shows that torture\u00a0is ineffective and unjustifiable,\u00a0once the principle of\u00a0reasoning on the basis of formal models is accepted, others\u00a0will build models that\u00a0might\u00a0show that torture\u00a0works.<\/p>\n

‘..[B]y placing his model within the framework of social science, he invites others to challenge him on that basis. If creating a formal model of interrogational torture is a\u00a0legitimate way to argue against it, then social scientists could legitimately use the same methods to argue for it.’<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

At one level, I agree. Decades of game-theoretic modeling in economics have shown that by choosing the right assumptions and setup of the game, one can derive any result one wishes. But at the same time, there is something characteristically medieval about the argument –\u00a0torture should be beyond the realm of reason, the only arguments we\u00a0should have\u00a0about the practice should be emotional and moral, not rational and\u00a0theoretical. Was it Anselm of Canterbury<\/a> who lamented himself for being able to prove the existence of God, anticipating that\u00a0reason would be ultimately used to deny God’s presence?<\/p>\n

What’s more annoying about Howes’ critique is that instead of discussing the original analysis, he prefers to attack rational choice in general as a research paradigm: ‘The<\/em> most strident critics of rational choice theory argue that it distorts reality in a way that is corrosive to democracy<\/em>.’…‘The close relationship between the rise of rational choice theory in the social sciences and U.S.government and military initiatives is well established.<\/em>‘ This makes as much sense as rejecting the\u00a0physics of nuclear fusion because its study\u00a0has its origins in Nazi Germany. From these blanket statements about rational choice, Howe’s jups to the conclusion that ‘Schiemann\u2019s formal model is conducive to bureaucratic violence.’ <\/em>Not sure what that means but it sounds nasty.<\/p>\n

Predictably,\u00a0Schiemann\u2019s response<\/a> easily demolishes these ‘critiques’ and reaffirms the utility of game theory to shed light on normative political questions. But I find it a bit disturbing that crutiques of the use of reason (and models) to shed light on social and political phenomena can still find a place on the pages of scientific journals at all.<\/p>\n

P.S. Exchanges on the pages of academic journals are a great way to learn. Here is another post<\/a> which reviews an exchange related to gender discrimination at work.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The latest issue of Political Research Quarterly has an interesting and important exchange about the use of game theory to understand the effectiveness of torture\u00a0for eliciting truthful information. In this post I summarize the discussion, which is quite instructive for illustrating the prejudices and misunderstandings people have about the role and utility of game theory as a tool to gain insights\u00a0into the social world. In the original article, Schiemann builds a strategic\u00a0incomplete-information game between a detainee (who can\u00a0either posses valuable information or not, and be either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’) and a state which can be either ‘pragmatic’ (using torture only for valuable information) or ‘sadistic’ (torturing in all circumstances). There are two additional parameters capturing uncertainty about the value and completeness of the information provided by the detainee, and two styles of interrogation (providing leading evidence or not). The article\u00a0then proceeds to identify the equilibria of the game, which turn out to be quite a few (six),\u00a0and quite different\u00a0– in some, truthful information is provided while\u00a0in others, not; in some, torture is applied while\u00a0in others, not; etc….\u00a0At this point\u00a0you will be excused\u00a0for\u00a0wondering\u00a0what’s the point of the formal modeling if it only shows that, depending on the parameters, different things are possible. Schiemann, however, makes a brilliant move by comparing each of these equilibria to some minimal normative standards that proponents of torture claim to uphold – namely, that torture\u00a0should not be used on detainees who have provided all their information, that transmitted information\u00a0should be\u00a0generally reliable,\u00a0and that in all cases only…<\/p>\n

Continue readingTorture and game theory<\/span><\/a><\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"spay_email":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false},"categories":[18,32],"tags":[191,213,360,368,442,543,653,654],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p7g3hj-60","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":489,"url":"http:\/\/re-design.dimiter.eu\/?p=489","url_meta":{"origin":372,"position":0},"title":"Tit-for-tat no more: new insights into the origin and evolution of cooperation","date":"June 26, 2012","format":false,"excerpt":"The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)\u00a0is\u00a0the paradigmatic\u00a0scientific model to understand human cooperation. You would think that after\u00a0several decennia of analyzing this\u00a0deceivingly simple game, nothing new can be learned. 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