Immigration and voting for the radical right in Andalusia

I wrote a short text for the European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) blog on the link between immigration presence and voting for Vox, a relatively young radical right party, in the Spanish region of Andalusia.  Full text is here, see also this post from 2015 about a similar link with Euroscepticism in the UK. The most important graph is below. Here is an excerpt:

 
To sum up, the available empirical evidence suggests that the relative size of the non-Western foreign-born population at the municipal level is positively, and rather strongly, related to the share of votes cast for Vox, the first Spanish radical right party to get in parliament since the end of Franco’s regime. Immigration might be responsible to a considerable extent for the resurgence of the radical right in Andalusia.

5 simple things to know about asylum policy in the European Union

Migration is quickly turning into the defining issue of our time. This might sound cliché, but is true. Not only does migration top the list of most important problems facing society, but it is also divisive in a way no other issue is. Unlike problems like inequality or the environment, immigration polarizes and divides opinions of ordinary people in a manner that cuts through social classes, education levels, age groups, and political affiliations. Divisions and bitter disagreements run even within families and close circles of friends. For no other issue do I see on my Facebook wall the full gamut of opinions ranging from strong rejection of migrants and refugees to their unconditional welcome and embrace. Most opinions of course fall somewhere in-between expressing, for example, support for `genuine’ refugees fleeing war but not for economic migrants, or for Christian but not for Muslim immigrants; yet, deep and important disagreements remain.

The current crisis with the influx of hundreds-of-thousands asylum-seekers in Europe in the summer of 2015 is only but the current episode of the unfolding migration drama. The crisis and the political responses to it bring powerful emotions in people: fear and compassion, anger and humility, empathy and contempt. Together with polarization, emotions further cloud the discussion of asylum policies and the right thing for the European countries to do in this situation. In response, I want to share five simple things I happen to know about asylum policies in the EU. I am by no means a specialist on the legal aspects of asylum or migration law. My expertise comes from two rather technical policy studies I have conducted on the aggregate patterns of asylum applications and country refugee recognition rates over the last decade, and on their relationships with the broader social and political contexts. (see here and here for the academic articles and here for a blogpost and visualization based on them)

1) The asylum policies of the countries members of the European Union still differ a lot. Despite a considerable body of EU legislation harmonizing national asylum policies, in effect these national policies have not converged to a common set of standards and rules. The differences concern the handling of asylum application procedures (e.g. their duration), the actual support provided by the state to the applicants during the procedure, the quality of the reception facilities, the rights and privileges gained after (and if) a refugee status is granted, the forms of alternative protection if a refugee status is not granted, and what happens to those who are refused any protection. Most importantly of all, however, the EU member states differ significantly with respect to their recognition rates (the share of applications that are granted the refugee status) even for applicants from the same country of origin. By implication, this means that different states apply rather different criteria when assessing the asylum applications.
These differences are crucial to understand why a joint common EU asylum application center does not seem politically feasible at the moment and is not even being discussed as an option to respond to the current crisis. Until such considerable differences exist, a truly single European policy on asylum would remain out of sight.

2) The strictness of national policies towards asylum-seekers matter relatively little for the asylum flows they receive. You can think that by tightening their asylum policies – making reception conditions worse, reducing support during the application and after, or lowering the recognition rate, countries can lessen the asylum application burden that they face. But in fact asylum flows tend to be relatively insensitive and unresponsive, at least in the short and medium terms, to the strictness of national asylum policies and to how low or high the national recognition rates are. So manipulating national policy is not an effective tool to divert (or attract) asylum application flows. The same goes for the effect of current economic conditions or the political climate in a country (for example, whether there is broad public and party support or opposition to migrants). Asylum flows are directed to a large degree by geographical convenience and existing transit networks, by hearsay and stereotypes to be affected by the details of national asylum policies or recognition rates. The implication of all that is that no single country can unilaterally isolate itself from the asylum flows coming to Europe. That being said, because asylum flows are highly clustered (see below), not being on what is at the moment the most convenient route to Western and Northern Europe can dramatically affect the number of asylum-seekers that pass through or end up in your country.

3) Asylum-seekers from the same nationality or region tend to cluster in particular places. Not only do asylum-seekers from the same region or country tend to travel on the same routes employing the same networks and middlemen, but they also tend to cluster when and where they choose a place to lodge an application and where they settle if allowed. These points are quite intuitive. Extended family ties and networks provide for crucial information about handling the asylum-application process and about the living and working conditions in the host country and city. They also provide support and protection, etc. So no wonder that new asylum-seekers and refugees try to go to where they family and friends already are.
What is important to recognize, however, are the not so obvious policy implications of the fact that asylum-seekers and refugees cluster in space. Because migrants would tend to congregate in few places, these places would be subject to a much greater asylum burden than others. This goes for countries, but also for cities and regions within countries.
That is why countries are reluctant to let asylum-seekers and refugees settle wherever they wish in the EU. Otherwise, the fear is that because of the attracting power of existing networks of relatives and compatriots, very few places will have to deal with the challenges of supporting and integrating a great proportion of the refugees. The call for mandatory country (and existing regional within-country) quotas are partly responding to these expectations.

4) Even when recognized as such, refugees do not enjoy a freedom of movement in the EU. As mentioned above, refugees (and asylum-seekers) are not allowed to move, reside and work freely within the EU, unlike citizens of its member states. Even though recognized refugees might have the rights to work and live in the country that has recognized their status and even benefit from the national social protection policies, they cannot choose to relocate to another member states. This is important in order to understand why it is so crucial for the asylum-seekers to reach the desired place in Europe before they lodge an application.
But it is also important to understand why the compulsory re-settlement based on country quotas that the European Commission proposes would likely not work. Even if adopted by the Council (which at the moment seems rather unlikely), the scheme would run into troubles the moment the refugees try to skip their imposed host countries and go to where their family and support networks are. And they will. The resettlement quote scheme would then have to be coupled with measures like compulsory self-reporting or tagging that would allow for tracing the location of refugees and asylum seekers. Such measures would not only by expensive, but morally objectionable as well.

5) Even when their requests for asylum are rejected, asylum seekers often stay in Europe. This is the dirty little secret of asylum policy in Europe. Even when an asylum application has been rejected, and even when other forms of alternative protection are not granted, the migrants are rarely sent back to their country of origin. They either disappear into illegality but never leave the continent or exist in a para-legal limbo where their presence is tolerated but no support is provided. European countries differ in the extent to which they allow this to happen, and it is hard to get precise numbers about the scale of the problem, but it is in any case huge. Alternatives are, however, hard to find as locating and sending people back to their country of origin is expensive, often impossible if the migrants lack proper documents, and, many would argue, morally objectionable. But this fact undermines the idea that asylum-seekers are a special group of migrants who are only allowed to stay in the country if they face serious threats for their lives and dignity at home. If those who are rejected are allowed or tolerated to stay anyways, the difference between an asylum-seeker and a migrant motivated by economic or other reasons is much hard to draw in the public mind. Note that I am not saying that people migrating for reasons others than fleeing wars and persecution should not be welcomed; only that many people have different attitudes and policy preferences with respect to different groups of migrants, and that blurring the boundaries between the groups can have negative consequences for people’s selective support of particular groups, like refugees.

 All in all, none of these five points suggest a comprehensive solution to the current asylum crisis or point to a clear way forward. What they do, hopefully, is to outline some of the facts and constraints that those in power must have in mind when designing responses to the situation and some arguments with which the judge existing proposals.

To put my cards on the table, I currently think that a combination of three policies can be preferable to the current system and to existing proposals:

  • A centralized single EU-managed system of asylum application centers at places along (and perhaps even outside) the borders of the EU, financed by the EU budged and staffed by European civil servants (support for the regions where the application centers are located would be needed to handle the flow of asylum-seekers during the time their applications are being assessed);
  • Free movement for recognized asylum seekers within the continent. This should include the rights to move, settle, and work, but not necessarily access to the social systems of the host countries. Places where refugees happen to cluster disproportionately would get support from a pot to which all countries contribute.
  • Strict control of the external borders of the EU to channel the applications through the official centers and strict `no access’ policy for people denied asylum or alternative forms of protection.

This would represent a rather drastic change from the system currently in place so it probably has low political feasibility. At the same time, current proposals do not seem to fare much better in the EU decision-making bodies, so the scale of required changes should be no reason to disregard the ideas.

Immigration from Central and Eastern Europe fuels support for Eurosceptic parties in the UK

[Note: re-post from Eurosearch]

Combining political, demographic and economic data for the local level in the UK, we find that the presence of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is related to higher voting shares cast for parties with Eurosceptic positions at the 2014 elections for the European Parliament. Evidence across Europe supports the connection between immigration from CEE and the electoral success of anti-Europe and anti-immigration political parties.

Immigration has become the top political issue in the UK. It played a pivotal role during the European Parliament elections in 2014 and it is the most-talked about issue in the build-up to the national elections in 2015.

The arrival of Eastern Europeans in the wake of the ‘Big Bang’ EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007  has a large part of the blame to take for the rising political salience of immigration for the British public. Figure 1 shows that ever since the EU accession of the first post-communist countries in 2004, immigration has been considered one of the two most important issues facing the country by a substantial proportion of British citizens, surpassing even concerns about the economy, except for the period between 2008 and 2012.

Data source: Standard Eurobarometer (59 to 82).
Data source: Standard Eurobarometer (59 to 82).

These popular concerns have swiftly made their way into the electoral arena. Some political parties like UKIP and BNP have taken strong positions in favor of restricting immigration and against the process of European integration in general. Others, like the Conservative party, have advocated restricting access of EU immigrants to the British labour market[5] while retaining an ambivalent position towards the EU. Parties with positions supportive of immigration and European integration have altogether tried to dodge the issues for fear of electoral punishment. Arguably, political and media attention to immigration (and East European immigrants in particular) have acted to reinforce the public concerns. In short, British voters care about and fear immigration, and political parties have played to, if not orchestrated, the tune.

But there is more to this story. In recent research we find evidence that higher actual levels of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at the local level in the UK are related to higher shares of the vote cast for Eurosceptic parties at the last European Parliament elections in 2014. In other words, British Eurosceptic parties have received, on average and other things being equal, more votes in localities with higher relative shares of East European residents.

The relationship is not easy to uncover. Looking directly into the correlation between relative local-level CEE immigration population shares and the local vote shares of Eurosceptic parties would be misleading. Immigrants do not settle randomly, but take the economic and social context of the locality into account. At the same time, this local economic and social context is related to the average support for particular parties. For example, local unemployment levels are strongly positively correlated with the  vote share for the Labour party, and the local share of highly educated people is strongly positively correlated with the vote share for the Greens (based on the 2014 EP election results). Therefore, we have to examine the possible link between CEE immigration shares and the vote for Eurosceptic parties net of the effect of the economic and social local contexts which, in technical terms, potentially confound the relationship.

In addition, immigrants themselves can vote at the EP elections and they are more likely to vote for EU-friendly parties. This would tend to attenuate any positive link between the votes of the remaining local residents and support for Eurosceptic parties. Lastly, the available local level immigration statistics track only immigrants who have been in the country longer than three months (as of 27 March 2011). Hence, they miss more recent arrivals, seasonal workers and immigrants who have not been reached by the Census at all. All these complications stack the deck against finding a positive relationship between the local presence of CEE immigrants and the vote for Eurosceptic parties. It is thus even more remarkable that we do observe one.

Figure 2: A scatterplot of the relative share of CEE immigrants from the local population versus the residual share of the vote cast for Eurosceptic parties (UKIP and BNP) at the 2014 EP elections

Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of the logged share of CEE immigrants from the local level population as of 2011 (on the horizontal axis) against the residual share of local level vote shares of Eurosceptic parties (UKIP and BNP) at the 2014 EP election (on the vertical axis). Each dot represents one locality (lower-tier council areas in England and unitary council areas in Wales and Scotland) and the size of the dot is proportional to the number of inhabitants. A few localities are labeled. The voting share is residual of all effects of the local unemployment level, and the relative shares of highly educated people, atheists, and non-Western immigrants in the population. In other words, the vertical axis shows the proportion of the vote for Eurosceptic parties unexplained by other social and economic variables.

The black straight line that best fits all observations is included as a guide to the eye. Its positive slope indicates that, on average, higher shares of CEE immigrants are related with higher Eurosceptic vote shares. Formal statistical tests show that the relationship is unlikely to be due to chance alone.

While the link is discernable from random fluctuations in the data, it is far from deterministic. Some of the localities with the highest relative shares of CEE immigrants, like Brent, have in fact only moderate Eurosceptic vote shares, and some localities with the highest share of the vote cast for Eurosceptic parties, like Hartlepool, have very low registered presence of CEE immigrants. Nevertheless, even if it only holds on average, the relationship remains substantially important.

Does this mean that people born in the UK are more likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties because they have had more contact with East Europeans? Not necessarily. Relationships at the level of individual citizens cannot be inferred from relationships at an aggregate level (otherwise, we would be committing what statisticians call ecological fallacy). In fact, there is plenty of research in psychology and sociology showing that direct and sustained contact with members of an out-group, like immigrants, can decrease prejudice and xenophobic attitudes. But research has also found that the sheer presence of an out-group, especially when direct contact is limited and the public discourse is hostile, can heighten fears and feelings of threat of the host population as well. Both mechanisms for the effect of immigration presence on integration attitudes – the positive one of direct contact and the negative one of outgroup presence – are compatible with the aggregate level relationship that we find. And they could well coexist – for a nice illustration see this article in the Guardian  together with the comments section.

Is it really the local presence of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe in particular that leads to higher support for Eurosceptic parties? It is difficult to disentangle the effects of CEE immigrants and immigrants from other parts of the world, as their local level shares share are correlated. Yet, the relative share of non-Western immigrants from the local population appears to have a negative association with support for Eurosceptic parties across a range of statistical model specifications, while the effect of CEE immigrants remains positive no matter whether non-Western immigration has been controlled for or not.

There is also evidence for an interaction between the presence of immigrants from CEE and from other parts of the world. The red line in Figure 2 is fitted only to the localities that have lower than the median share of non-western immigrants. It is steeper than the black one which indicates that for these localities the positive effect of CEE immigrants on Eurosceptic votes is actually stronger. The blue line is fitted only to the localities with lower than the median share of non-western immigrants. It is sloping in the other direction which implies that in localities with relatively high shares of immigrants from other parts of the world, the arrival of East Europeans does not increase the vote for Eurosceptic parties.

It is interesting to note the recent statement by UKIP leader Nigel Farage that he prefers immigrants from form former British colonies like Australia and India to East Europeans. Focusing rhetorical attacks on immigrants from CEE in particular fits and makes sense in light of the story told above.

We (with Elitsa Kortenska) also find that CEE immigration increases Euroscepticism at the local level in other countries as well. In a recently published article (ungated pre-print here) we report this effect in the context of the referenda on the ill-fate European Constitution in Spain, France, and The Netherlands in 2005 and on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland in 2008. In ongoing work we argue that local level presence of CEE immigrants is systematically related to higher vote shares cast for Eurosceptic parties in Austria, The Netherlands, and France, in addition to the British case discussed in this post.

Why does this all matter? The process of European integration presupposes the right of people to move and work freely within the borders of the Union. This is not only a matter of convenience, but of economic necessity. People from regions experiencing economic hardship must be able to move to other EU regions with growing economies for economic integration to function. In an integrated economy like the EU or the US, a Romanian or a Greek must be free to seek employment in the UK or in Poland the same way an American living in Detroit is able to relocate to California in search of work and fortune.

This is especially true given the lack of large-scale redistribution between EU regions. Economic Integration creates regional inequalities. One way to respond is to redistribute the benefits of integration. Another is to allow people and workers to move where employment chances are currently high. If none of these mechanisms is available, economic and political integration are doomed. Therefore, if immigration within the EU indeed fuels Euroscepticism, as our study suggests, the entire European integration project is at risk.